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Simulation-optimization techniques are employed to analyze changes in farmland control 
arrangements as a result of using different constructs of intertemporal risk behavior.  Risk 
behavior based on constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) mean-standard deviation functions are used to achieve this objective. Specfically, a 
multi-period programming framework for a representative grain farm is developed to explore 
farmland control decisions under these two behavioral assumptions. Our results suggest that the 
use of a CRRA behavioral construct in analyzing farmland control decisions produce predictions 
that are more consistent with observed farm behavior. 
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Farmland Control Decisions under Different Intertemporal Risk Behavioral Constructs 
Farmland leasing, either through payment of pre-determined cash rents or sharing of 
production revenues and certain production costs (between landlords and farm operator-tenants), 
has become an increasingly popular alternative for gaining additional farm acreage outside the 
land purchase option.  For example, the USDA's 1998 Agricultural Resource Management 
Survey (ARMS) study indicates that 43.8% of farmland acres in the United States are operated 
under a leasing contract.  Leasing is even a more dominant practice in Midwestern United States.  
In Illinois, for instance, 78% to 86% of tillable farmland is either cash- or share-rented, a trend 
maintained over the period 1995-2001 according to a 2002 survey (Barry, Sotomayor, and 
Moss). In the late eighties, the average tenure ratio (proportion of land owned to total acreage 
operated) for participating farms under the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) 
was 24% (Ellinger, et al.) 
A farm operator usually expands the area of controlled farmland for farm operations 
through one of the two leasing arrangements, through debt-financed land ownership, or a 
combination of any of these three methods. Farmland control decisions are usually based on the 
different risk-return tradeoffs realized under the three alternative control methods. Share leasing 
is considered the most highly risk efficient financing option for farmers (Barry, et al.).  The 
positive correlation between the value of harvested crops and the tenant farmer’s rental 
obligation to the landowner stabilizes the farmer’s net income, thus resulting in greater risk-
reducing benefits for the farm operator.  Cash leasing, on the other hand, offers farmers simpler, 
more flexible bidding opportunities for greater farmland control, though the farmer ends up 
assuming all production and income risks (Barry, Sotomayor and Moss).   4
The risk-return tradeoffs of the farmland control decision problem can be evaluated using 
an expected utility mean-variance (EUMV) framework, an analytical tool widely used in 
economics and finance to analyze how people make choices among risky alternative actions.  
Meyer developed a generalized EUMV framework based on the location-scale parameter 
condition that ensures the equivalence of preference ordering under expected utility and mean-
variance frameworks.  Meyer’s work generalized the EUMV approach to resolve restrictive 
conditions previously imposed on utility functions and distribution properties of the random 
variable.  These restrictive conditions have limited previous risk analyses to EUMV formulation 
exhibiting a specific risk behavioral construct, i.e. constant absolute and increasing relative risk 
aversion (CARA-IRRA).  Nelson and Escalante utilized Meyer’s general economic decision 
model to develop an alternative to the CARA-IRRA framework that adopts the more empirically 
supported behavior of decreasing absolute and constant relative risk aversion (DARA-CRRA). 
This study considers the CARA-IRRA and DARA-CRRA models to determine trends in 
farmland control decisions that can be influenced by changes in intertemporal risk behavior.  A 
multi-period programming framework using optimization-simulation techniques applied to a 
representative grain farm is used to accomplish this objective.  The mathematical programs are 
developed by separately using the decision problem statement functions for the CARA-IRRA 
and DARA-CRRA models. The analytical framework is then expanded to accommodate 
sensitivity analyses involving gradual increases in the magnitude of the risk variable to 
determine changes in the optimal farmland control solutions.  The following sections discuss the 
theoretical model in greater detail, explain the simulation-optimization analytical approach, and 
then present this study’s results and their implications. 
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Theoretical/Conceptual Foundations 
Background  
An expected utility-mean variance (EUMV) framework will be used to analyze patterns 
of choices among available farmland control strategies by considering these options’ risk-return 
tradeoff profiles and the underlying intertemporal risk attitudes of farm operators. The traditional 
form of the unconstrained EUMV decision model used in the analyses of farm finance, 
marketing, and production issues has been: 
( 1 )       E(U(W)) = µ – 0.5ρσ
2 
where  E(U(W)) is the expected utility of final wealth, : is the expected (or the mean) final 
wealth,  σ
2 is the variance of final wealth and D is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. 
Consistent with Freund’s results, this model is formulated as a static mean variance 
representation of an expected utility maximization problem with normally distributed returns and 
a risk behavior exhibiting constant absolute and increasing relative risk aversion (CARA-IRRA).  
The model produces intuitively reasonable solutions and behavioral predictions, with an 
important exception about its prediction on responses to changes in initial wealth, predicting that 
optimal debt levels will decrease if initial wealth increases.  This is a result of the underlying 
behavioral assumption of CARA-IRRA, which implies that investments in a risky asset are a 
constant function of wealth.   
An alternative formulation of the model has been developed that replaces the CARA 
assumption with the decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) and constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA) behavioral hypotheses (Nelson and Escalante).  The alternative form of the 
objective function is: 
( 2 )       
22 1 (,) ( ) V σµ µ γ σ
− =− −    6
where the only modification from the original formulation, except for the new functional form, is 
the redefinition of the risk aversion parameter γ as a scaled coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
The new model retains the desirable comparative static properties of the existing CARA model 
while correcting the questionable negative initial equity effect by using the more desirable 
DARA-CRRA behavioral hypotheses.  
Empirical and Theoretical Arguments for DARA-CRRA 
On both theoretical and empirical planes, decreasing absolute risk aversion enjoys greater 
support than constant absolute risk aversion behavioral construct.  The intuitive appeal of the 
DARA behavior was presented in the original works of Arrow and Pratt, who introduced these 
intertemporal risk behavioral concepts. Since then, DARA behavior has been regarded as the 
normative concept.  Pratt argues that decision-makers would tend to “pay less for insurance 
against a given risk the greater their assets (p. 123)” while Arrow contends that a decision maker 
faced with increasing wealth would find it absurd to be more unwilling to take a fair bet 
involving a fixed amount. 
In agriculture and other applied areas of economics, DARA behavior has gained stronger 
empirical support than alternatives. Studies conducted by Saha, Shumay, and Talpaz, and Chavas 
and Holt provide evidence for the DARA behavior among farmers. The econometric analyses 
employed by other studies also indicate that measures of risk aversion vary inversely with land 
under control, off-farm income (Moscardi and de Janvry, Young, et al), and net worth (Patrick, 
Whitaker and Blake), thus, lending more support to DARA behavior. 
The original derivation of the CARA-IRRA model used results of Freund to justify the 
mean-variance functional form.  This justification carries with it the implicit assumptions of 
constant absolute risk aversion and normal returns. Constant absolute risk aversion might be an   7
acceptable behavioral hypothesis for a small class of decision-makers who have common wealth 
levels.  In this case, it would serve as an approximation.  But anytime the model is applied to 
decision-makers with significant differences in initial wealth, the constant absolute risk aversion 
behavioral construct should be replaced by decreasing absolute risk aversion.  Differences in 
initial wealth should cause significant differences in the willingness of decision-makers to 
undertake risky investments of a given size.  Frequently, decreasing absolute risk aversion is 
introduced by assuming constant relative risk aversion.  The implication of decreasing absolute 
risk aversion is the behavioral hypothesis of constant relative risk aversion. 
Another reason why the behavioral hypothesis of constant relative risk aversion is 
desirable is that such functions exhibit risk vulnerability.  The idea of risk vulnerability is: “... 
that adding an unfair background risk to wealth makes risk-averse individuals behave in a more 
risk-averse way with respect to another independent risk.”  (Gollier and Pratt, p.1110) An unfair 
risk is a risk with a non-positive expected value. One important implication of risk vulnerability 
is that opening new insurance or contingent claim markets should stimulate economic activity in 
other risky markets.  Risk vulnerability is a desirable behavioral hypothesis.  And utility 
functions with the property that absolute risk aversion is decreasing and convex are risk 
vulnerable (Gollier and Pratt, p.1117).  Thus, constant relative risk aversion utility functions 
have the desirable properties of risk vulnerability, and decreasing absolute risk aversion. 
Programming Applications on a Representative Grain Farm 
  A numerical optimization analysis of a representative grain farm using both the CRRA 
mean-standard deviation function and the CARA mean-standard deviation function is employed 
to illustrate different responses of key farmland control decision variables to a change in the 
farmer’s intertemporal risk behavior.  The analysis is also extended to determine the sensitivity   8
of such decision variables to changes in the decision-maker’s risk aversion level as well as 
increases in business and financial risk magnitudes. 
Base Financial Conditions 
A representative farm is created using average resource endowments, operating levels 
and financial conditions of about 1,004 grain farms in the North Central Region that participate 
under Illinois’ Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) Program.  This farm, managed by a 49 
year-old farmer belonging to a family of three,  produces corn and soybeans in a 50/50 rotation, 
operates a total of 862 tillable acres of farmland, of which 250 are owned and the remainder 
covered by leasing contract(s). 
  The fair market value of the farm’s assets is $1.02 million at the start of the programming 
horizon, including $209,253 worth of farm equipment, farm land property valued at $480,308, 
building improvements worth $105,536, and current assets of $224,862.  These assets were 
financed by 87% debt and 13% farm equity.  The family’s annual withdrawals from equity for 
family living expenses amount to $31,729, excluding income taxes. 
Using the financial and structural attributes of the representative farm as a starting point, 
this analysis assumes a two-year planning horizon and considers final wealth as the outcome 
variable that is determined by the value of farmland, farm equipment and ending cash balance, 
net of deductions for outstanding loan balances, at the end of the planning horizon.  This 
analytical framework is based on previous multi-period programming models developed by 
Barry and Willmann, and Gwinn, Barry and Ellinger. A large matrix of activities and constraints 
is developed where sub-matrices along the main diagonal elements correspond to time periods 
and off-diagonal elements represent transfers among the model’s activities.  The representative 
farm in this analysis is assumed to engage in production and marketing, land and machinery   9
investments, share and cash renting of farmland, liquidity management, consumption, taxation 
and incurring short-, intermediate- and long-term loans. Financing and operating decisions are 
constrained by limits set on land availability, machinery requirements, consumption, and 
borrowing levels.  Specifically, borrowing decisions are constrained by the level of the unused 
portion of the farm’s credit reserves, which is the amount that lenders are still willing to lend to 
the farm given existing financial obligations and operating conditions.  The level of credit 
reserves are calculated from liquidity changes in the balance sheet, expected income, changes in 
outstanding loan levels, and changes in asset values (Gwinn, Barry and Ellinger 1992).  Credit 
decisions are also matched with the type of asset acquisition decisions.  Specifically, long-, 
medium- (or intermediate-) and short-term loans can supplement internally generated funds 
intended to be used for the acquisition of farm real estate (or fixed assets), farm equipment (or 
other intermediate assets), and operating capital requirements, respectively. 
Timing and Liquidity Issues 
In order to capture the timing of cash flows within a particular year, the cash transfer 
equation has two sub-periods.  This feature of the programming model allows us to capture 
timing and liquidity issues that may determine preferences of the leasing parties for share versus 
cash lease contracts.  Under share leases the landlord is obligated for his share of variable costs 
when payment is due.  Under cash leasing, the farmer often must pay all or part of the annual 
rent in advance and bear all of the operating expenses, thus placing greater demands on his cash 
flow.  Additionally, the landlord may require higher per acre cash rents for late or split payments 
(e.g. half paid during spring, the other half in fall) to compensate for her time value of money.   
In the programming model, the landlord is assumed to advance (during the first transfer 
period) half of the shared operating costs under a share lease contract. Cash rents are paid in two   10
equal installments during the production year. Down payment for land purchases are paid as 
transactions are completed, while loan amortizations for credit incurred to purchase land are 
regularly paid on an annual basis, in accordance with a specified loan amortization schedule. 
The Variance-Covariance Matrix 
Historical data on the decision variables of the model are used to construct a variance-
covariance matrix that accounts for the sources of risk in the model.  The decision variables in 
this model represent purchases of additional farmland (ACBUY) and farm machinery (EQBUY), 
share (SHLEASE) and/or cash renting (ACRENT) of supplemental farmland acreage, and 
incremental loans incurred under short- (SHTCRED), intermediate- (MEDCRED) and long-term 
(FINLAND) credit facilities.  Specifically, the sources of risk are defined as follows.  The 
variability of gross crop margins (ACPROD) captures the combined effects of the variability of 
crop yields and prices over a long period of time.  Unanticipated changes in asset values are 
accounted for by considering the variability of land (ACBUY) and equipment (EQBUY) values.  
Changes in gross margins resulting from payment of cash rental rates (ACRENT) are included to 
provide additional source of variability not captured by the land value component of the matrix.  
The effective risk reduction mechanism inherent in share leasing contracts (Barry, et al.) is 
introduced by recalculating reduced levels of gross margins (SHLEASE) according to the 
sharing arrangement assumed in the model. Finally, the volatility of borrowing costs for short-
term operating loans (SHTCRED), intermediate term loans for equipment purchases 
(MEDCRED) and long-term real estate loans (FINLAND) is considered to capture the financial 
risk component of the model. 
This analysis used fourteen years of historical data (1985-1998) obtained from the 
Agricultural Finance Data Book published by the U. S. Department of Agriculture and from the   11
Illinois Agricultural Statistics Service web site.  The signs of the entries in the matrix, except for 
covariance terms among asset/income-generating activities and among liabilities/cost-generating 
activities, were adjusted to correctly specify directional effects of certain pairs of activities on 
risk reduction.  Specifically, this adjustment ensures that lower correlations are more preferred 
among assets (and among liabilities) which potentially reduce aggregate risk in the model.  
Moreover, higher correlations between assets and liabilities were assigned the opposite of their 
estimated signs to account for the reversal of the preferred correlation relationship between these 
activities. 
Levels of Risk and Risk Aversion 
Initial runs assumed a base risk level determined by the historical values for the decision 
variables that were used to develop the variance-covariance matrix.  Sensitivity to increases in 
risk was analyzed by considering four additional scenarios where the variance-covariance matrix 
was multiplied by scalars 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, and 3.0. 
Several levels of risk aversion were considered for both the CARA-IRRA and DARA-
CRRA models.  The CRRA model, which adopts the coefficient of relative risk aversion as a 
representation of risk attitudes, used risk aversion levels falling within the bounds [0.27, 4.95], 
calculated by Nelson and Escalante using mean historical financial attributes of Illinois farms.  
The CARA model’s risk aversion parameter values, which correspond to the coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion, are within the range [0.000004, 0.346574], established by Babcock, Choi, 
and Feinerman in their study of risk and probability premiums for CARA utility functions 
(Babock, Choi and Feinerman 1993).  Both of these sets of bounds appear to be reasonable 
limits, given the plausible programming solution levels obtained in the analysis.   
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Results and Discussion 
Table 1 summarizes the programming results under the two risk behavioral constructs 
and under different levels of risk aversion.  The CARA-IRRA model used absolute risk aversion 
levels ranging from 0.000004 to 0.00012 while the risk aversion values in the DARA-CRRA 
model ranged from 0.27 to 1.90.  The low and high endpoints of these two ranges were paired to 
correspond to lower and higher risk aversion conditions, respectively.  The values 0.00008 and 
0.90 were chosen to represent “moderate” risk aversion conditions for the CARA-IRRA and 
DARA-CRRA models, respectively.   
Under the CARA-IRRA model, increases in the levels of absolute risk aversion resulted 
in substantial downsizing of farm operations.  Optimal farm size is substantially reduced from 
851 acres under the lowest risk aversion level to only 323 acres for the most risk-averse farmer, 
representing a downsizing rate of 62.04%.  Other farm size adjustments in the CARA-IRRA 
model include a reduction of 352 acres (or a downsizing rate of 41.36%) from the low to 
moderate risk aversion categories and 176 acres (or a reduction rate of 35.27%) as risk aversion 
shifted from moderate to high levels.   
Results under the CRRA model indicate less downsizing -- from 906 acres using the 
lower bound value of the risk aversion parameter to 407 acres for the upper bound value. This 
only amounts to a 55.08% reduction rate.  The shift from low to moderate risk aversion produced 
a downsizing rate of 41.50% (which is comparable to the result obtained in the CARA-IRRA 
model above) but the change from moderate to high risk aversion only resulted in a reduction of 
123 acres or a rate of 23.08%.   
The adjustment rates in the optimal debt solutions across different levels of risk aversion 
are not consistent with the farm size reduction rates under the two models.  The CARA-IRRA   13
debt solutions decreased at a much slower rate relative to changes in the total asset size, thus 
resulting in increasing debt-to-asset ratios as risk aversion increased.  Reduction rates in DARA-
CRRA optimal debt solution levels, on the other hand, were large enough relative to the total 
asset size reductions, thus, resulting in debt-to-asset ratio solutions that were decreasing as risk 
aversion levels were increased.   
The optimal leasing solution levels provide interesting implications when analyzed along 
with the farm downsizing trends observed in both models.  Given the risk aversion parameter 
values for low and moderate risk aversion,  the proportion of share leased acres to farm size 
increased from 0.6691 to 0.7198 in the DARA-CRRA model.  In the same model and 
transitioning from low to moderate risk aversion, the proportion of cash leased acres to farm size 
decreased from 0.1268 to 0.  The same (decreasing) trend in cash leasing ratios is noted in the 
CARA-IRRA programming results.  However, the CARA-IRRA model produced decreasing 
share leasing ratios (from 0.0900 to 0.0416) as risk aversion categories shift from low to 
moderate levels (as compared to the increasing share leasing ratio under DARA-CRRA).   
These trends in share and cash leasing ratio solutions are plotted in Figure 1 for the three 
levels of risk aversion.  The plots indicate that the trends observed in the transition from low to 
moderate risk aversion were reversed for both (cash and share) leasing ratios under the DARA-
CRRA model and for the share leasing ratio in the CARA-IRRA model.  Only the cash leasing 
ratio under the CARA-IRRA model displayed monotonically decreasing solution values. 
Tables 2 to 4 summarize the results under increasing risk conditions.  Each table 
correspond to a risk aversion category (low, moderate, and high) and presents results on the 
optimal programming solution levels for the same set of variables listed in Table 1 under 
conditions of increasing risk.  The initial base risk (given by the calculated variance-covariance   14
matrix) used in deriving solutions reported in Table 1 has been increased 4 times through scalar 
multiplication of the matrix.  As mentioned in the previous section, the scalar multiplier values 
used were 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, and 3.0.   
Across all levels of risk aversion (Tables 2 to 4), increases in the magnitude of the risk 
variable resulted in shrinkages in farm size solution levels.  In the low and moderate risk 
aversion categories (Tables 2 and 3), the CARA-IRRA model consistently produced more 
significant downsizing trends than the DARA-CRRA model.  In Table 2, for instance, the 
optimal farm size levels decreased at an average rate of 21.35% for every 50% increase in risk in 
the CARA-IRRA model, while the equivalent rate for the DARA-CRRA model is only 11.83%.  
In absolute terms, the CARA-IRRA farm size solutions started at 686 acres when risk increased 
1.5 times and ended up at 323 acres when the risk level was tripled.  In the DARA-CRRA model, 
the optimal farm size started at 890 acres when risk was 1.5 times larger than the base level and 
became 541 acres when the base risk level tripled. 
The low risk aversion category produced clearer trends in the optimal solution levels for 
the leasing variables.  These trends can be deduced from the plots presented in Figure 2.  The 
DARA-CRRA model yielded share leasing ratio solutions following a U-curve trend across 
increasing risk levels.  This means that share leasing ratios tended to decrease slightly as 
relatively smaller increases in risk are experienced.  The initial downward trend in the share 
leasing ratios, however, reaches a minimum when the risk matrix was multiplied by 2. As further 
increases in risk were assumed, a much steeper increasing trend in the ratios was observed.The 
cash leasing ratio solutions for the DARA-CRRA model, on the other hand, follow an inverted U 
trend.  The peak is also recorded at the point when risk was doubled. The CARA-IRRA solutions 
obtained displayed the same trends as those noted in the DARA-CRRA solutions.  The minimum   15
share leasing ratio and maximum cash leasing ratio were recorded at the point when risk 
increased 1.5 times. 
In both Figures 1 and 2 and across all tables (1 to 4), it can be observed that the CARA-
IRRA model tend to produce higher cash leasing and lower share leasing solution ratios.  Share 
leasing, on the other hand, is a more dominant form of farmland control arrangement in the 
DARA-CRRA model.  In Figures 1 and 2, for instance, the DARA-CRRA share rented ratio and 
CARA-IRRA cash rented plots are always above the other two plots. 
Summary and Conclusions 
  This study utilized multi-period programming techniques to analyze the effects of 
changes in the intertemporal risk behavioral assumptions on farmland control decision variables.   
Decision problem statements reflecting the risk behavioral assumptions of CARA-IRRA and 
DARA-CRRA were used in the programming framework.  Iterations of the programming model 
were introduced to capture changes in farmland control decisions as a result of changes in the 
decision maker’s risk attitudes and increases in the magnitude of risk. 
  The results indicate that both the CARA-IRRA and DARA-CRRA models produced 
optimal farm size solutions that monotonically decrease as farmers’ risk aversion increases.  
Farm downsizing, however, has been more significant in the CARA-IRRA model.  Increases in 
risk aversion from low to moderate levels also produced greater reliance on share leasing as a 
form of farmland control arrangement in the DARA-CRRA framework.  A contrasting 
(declining) trend in share leasing ratios was observed in the CARA-IRRA framework, which 
favors cash leasing over the share leasing option. 
  Increases in the risks faced by the farmer also resulted in farm downsizing and the 
CARA-IRRA model again produced optimal farm size solutions that substantially declined as the   16
risk magnitude was increased (as compared to the lower decline observed in the DARA-CRRA 
model).  In the DARA-CRRA model, farmers tend to rely more on share leasing when the 
original base risk level is at least doubled.  In the CARA-IRRA model, farmers start to be 
increasingly dependent on share leasing when the base risk level is only increased 1.5 times. 
  The DARA-CRRA solutions consistently indicate greater dependence on share leasing as 
share leasing ratios obtained were significant larger than the DARA-CRRA cash leasing ratio 
solutions and the CARA-IRRA share leasing ratio solutions.  On the other hand, the CARA-
IRRA solutions produced comparably high cash leasing ratio solutions. 
Based on these preliminary results, the DARA-CRRA model tends to produce more 
plausible farmland control solutions that emphasize the greater relevance of share leasing as 
farmers become increasingly risk averse and under worsening farm business and financial risk 
conditions. In addition, our preliminary results show that very different inference about farmland 
control decisions may arise when the DARA-CRRA behavioral assumption is used in the 
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Table 1.  Programming solutions under the CARA-IRRA and DARA-CRRA models at different 
levels of risk aversion 
 
  
CARA-IRRA Model  DARA-CRRA Model  Variables 
0.000004 0.00008  0.00012  0.27 0.90 1.90 
Farm Size (acres)  851 499 323 906 530  407
Total Assets ($’000)  972 934 915 843 838  839
Total Debt ($’000)  381 368 363 382 370  365
Acres Cash Rented  602 294 80 115 0  54
Acres Share Rented  77 21 66 606 380  203
Cash Rented-Farm 
Size Ratio 
0.7073 0.5896 0.2485 0.1268 0.0000 0.1329
Share Rented-Farm 
Size Ratio 
0.0900 0.0416 0.2031 0.6691 0.7168 0.4988
Share Rented – 
Rented Acres Ratio 
0.1134 0.0667 0.4521 0.8405 1.0000 0.7899
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Table 2.  Programming solutions under the CARA-IRRA and DARA-CRRA models under 
increasing risk levels, LOW RISK AVERSION 
 
CARA-IRRA Model 
(risk aversion coefficient at 0.000004) 
DARA-CRRA Model 
(risk aversion coefficient at 0.27) 
Variables 
1.50 x  2.00 x  2.50 x  3.00 x  1.50 x  2.00 x  2.50 x  3.00 x 
Farm Size (acres)  686  499 378 323 890 793  628 541
Total Assets ($’000)  954  934 920 915 842 841  839 838
Total Debt ($’000)  375  368 365 363 382 378  373 371
Acres Cash Rented  509  294 142 80 168 198  53 0
Acres Share Rented  0  21 57 66 572 445  425 391
Cash Rented-Farm 
Size Ratio 
0.7419 0.5896 0.3742 0.2485 0.1888 0.2499  0.0847 0.0000
Share Rented-Farm 
Size Ratio 
0.0000 0.0416 0.1515 0.2031 0.6426 0.5610  0.6765 0.7228
Share Rented – 
Rented Acres Ratio 
0.0000 0.0667 0.2864 0.4521 0.7730 0.6921  0.8891 1.0000
























Table 3.  Programming solutions under the CARA-IRRA and DARA-CRRA models under 
increasing risk levels, MODERATE RISK AVERSION 
 
CARA-IRRA Model 
(risk aversion coefficient at 0.00008) 
DARA-CRRA Model 
(risk aversion coefficient at 0.90) 
Variables 
1.50 x  2.00 x  2.50 x  3.00 x  1.50 x  2.00 x  2.50 x  3.00 x 
Farm Size (acres)  323  297 282 271 472 422  369 337
Total Assets ($’000)  915  910 908 906 837 838  840 840
Total Debt ($’000)  363  362 362 361 368 366  364 362
Acres Cash Rented  80  92 102 104 0 39  94 128
Acres Share Rented  66  34 14 4 322 233  125 59
Cash Rented-Farm 
Size Ratio 
0.2485 0.3108 0.3623 0.3851 0.0000 0.0924  0.2551 0.3796
Share Rented-Farm 
Size Ratio 
0.2031 0.1134 0.0493 0.0156 0.6822 0.5522  0.3380 0.1749
Share Rented – 
Rented Acres Ratio 
0.4521 0.2698 0.1207 0.0370 1.0000 0.8566  0.5708 0.3155

























Table 4.  Programming solutions under the CARA-IRRA and DARA-CRRA models under 
increasing risk levels, HIGH RISK AVERSION 
 
CARA-IRRA Model 
(risk aversion coefficient at 0.00012) 
DARA-CRRA Model 
(risk aversion coefficient at 1.90) 
Variables 
1.50 x  2.00 x  2.50 x  3.00 x  1.50 x  2.00 x  2.50 x  3.00 x 
Farm Size (acres)  288  271 265 263 329 291  274 274
Total Assets ($’000)  909  906 905 904 840 841  842 842
Total Debt ($’000)  361  361 361 361 362 361  360 360
Acres Cash Rented  98  104 106 108 136 141  124 124
Acres Share Rented  23  4 0 0 42 0  0 0
Cash Rented-Farm 
Size Ratio 
0.3391 0.3851 0.4025 0.4106 0.4146 0.4854  0.4516 0.4516
Share Rented-Farm 
Size Ratio 
0.0783 0.0156 0.0000 0.0000 0.1291 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000
Share Rented – 
Rented Acres Ratio 
0.1876 0.0390 0.0000 0.0000 0.2374 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000
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Figure 1. Cash and Share Rented Ratios, CARA-IRRA and DARA-CRRA Models, 
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